In this post we
will discuss Peristence attack on Active Directory by abusing AdminSDHolder.
This attack is actual threat because This attack leverage into other dynamic
attack such as DCSync
Attack and Golden
ticket Attack.
AdminSDHolder
Active Directory
Domain Services uses AdminSDHolder, protected groups and Security Descriptor
propagator (SD propagator or SDPROP for short) to secure privileged users and
groups from unintentional modification. Unlike most objects in the Active
Directory domain, which are owned by the Administrators group, AdminSDHolder is
owned by the Domain Admins group.
The AdminSDHolder
object has a unique Access Control List (ACL), which is used to control the
permissions of security principals that are members of built-in privileged
Active Directory groups. Every hour, a
background process runs on the domain controller to campare manual
modifications to an ACL and overwrites them so that the ACL matches the ACL on
the AdminSDHolder object.
Read from here
for more detail.
AdminSDHolder Persistence Attack
On compromised domain controller with
administrator privilege the attacker is capable to create a permanent backdoor
for his future attack by abusing AdminSDHolder. With
help of this attack we will bel able to alters AdminSDHolder by adding a new
user to its Access Control List.
Here we will try
to add user Yashika into ACL of AdminSDHolder object in
order to change privilege for user yashika. Current User yashika is a domain
user as shown below.
Follow the step to learn how an attacker
can conduct AdminSDHolder attack.
1.
Navigate
to Active Director User aand Computers
2.
Explore
Menu > View> Advanced Features
3.
Explore System > AdminSDHolder
> Properties
4.
Add user to whom you want to
give Full Permission. Here I have choose user: “Yashika”
5.
Give Full Permission by enabling
All check box.
As we mention background process runs, by
default, every sixty (60) minutes but default frequency for running Security
Descriptor Propagator process could be changed by creating a REG_DWORD registry
entry and setting the new frequency value.
This can be done on compromised DC by
executing the following command inside command prompt which will reset Security
Descriptor Propagator process for 3 minutes (300 as decimal & 12c as
hexadecimal)
REG ADD HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters /V AdminSDProtectFrequency /T REG_DWORD /F /D 300
To ensure the fruitful result of above
command, explore the following path : HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Parameters
After three minutes we checked identify for
user “yashika” using net user command and notice Yashika has become the member
of domain admin group.
net user yashika /Domain
Even if the administrator try to remove
yashika form domain admin group then after 3 minute due to Security Descriptor
Propagator process it will again add Yashika into Domain Admin Group.
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