Introduction to Red Team
Red Teaming comes under
the level of assessment in information security domain. Red Teamers have to identify
the risk to the network infrastructure of an organisation as a measure of
pre-evaluation so that the execution of engagement can be carried properly. In
order to determine such risks, it is the primary responsibility of Red Team
operators to recognise potential threats or vulnerability. Various tools,
whether open source or commercial, can be used by Red Teamers to acknowledge
vulnerabilities and to exploit them to their advantage. However, the Red Teaming
approach is more in-depth than what most potential attackers follow because
they are attempting to find a single vulnerability, whereas security
professionals need to find all possible vulnerabilities for a given infrastructure
in order to assess the associated risk. Attackers typically only target a
single vulnerability for a specific exploit because to do otherwise would
increase the possibility for detection. Nevertheless, Red Teaming should test
for all types of attacks to provide a complete security assessment. Appropriate
situational awareness of security infrastructure is a result of detailed Red Team
research. But the process of Red Team will not be sufficient in identifying
risk; the organization should continue maintaining the security measures from
their end in order to appropriately manage risk and provide security
protection.
What is Red Team?
Red Team is a group
of highly skilled pentesters that are summoned by an organization to test their
defence and improve its effectiveness. Basically, it is the way of utilizing
strategies, systems, and methodology to simulate real-world scenarios so as to
prepare and measure security defences of the organisation. The objective of Red
Team is to simulate the real-world attacks in order to measure the
organization's defences, and their incident response Team. Red Team follows the
Roles of Engagement (RoE).
What are the aspects of Red Team?
·
Threat
Emulation
·
Operational
Impacts
·
Comparing
Red Team Engagement to other security testing types
·
Red
Team Operator Traits
Threat Emulation : This is process of mimicking the
TTP's of a specific threat. Emulation can be done of various attacks such as -
zero attacks, script kiddie to advanced adversary or a specific threat like
botnets, ransomware, DDOS, etc. No matter what the scenario, the TTPs outline
by the scenario drive the rules a Red Team must follow to perform an
engagement. When creating the threat emulation scenario, that threat's key
component should be defined. When in Practice it can be difficult to simulate
the real-world scenario in the exact manner. Therefore, the main focus of Red Team
is should be on the key component and then use their own TTPs to fill in the
gaps. The biggest challenge in threat emulation is simulating the threat to a
level where an analyst believes the threat is real, Approaches range from using
real malware to developing custom malware that models a real threat, to using
tools that generate the indicators of compromise (IOCs) an attack from a real
threat leaves behind. In any case, effective planning and determination of the
critical components of a threat will lead to better threat emulation design.
Operational
Impacts :
Operational Impacts are actions or effects performed against a target designed
to demonstrate physical, informational or operational weaknesses in security.
These effects can be as general as performing denial of service attack or more
specific such as using high jacked ICS equipment to control a city's power
grid. It is operational impacts that distinguishes Red Teamer from others.
Operational Impacts can be very effective in demonstrating realistic impacts
against a target. The level of depth and of the impact can be as ‘painful’ as
an organization is willing to explore. These impacts are typically performed
against live production systems to have the highest level of fidelity, but can
be executed on test and development environments if they are representative
systems.
Comparing Red Team
Engagement to other security testing types
Difference b/w Pentesting
and Red Team : Pentesting
is used to monitor control and identify vulnerability in order to secure them
along with testing the efficiency of the vulnerability management process. It
further helps to lay foundation for security policies. Basically, Pentesting is
testing the security environment of an infrastructure in order to find and
patch vulnerabilities in a limited span of time, so that we can eliminate the
false positive scenarios. In comparison to Red Team, Pentesting is most
rigorous and methodical testing of a network, hardware or application. During Pentesting,
the pentesters search for vulnerabilities, analysis them and exploit them.
Penetration tests are well defined and usually takes up to one to two weeks for
the whole process.
Red Team includes
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) by adversaries. Red -Team is just
like Pentesting in many ways but it is more targeted. A Red-Team over all
accesses and evaluates various areas of security through a multi-layered
approach. The mission is to present real-world scenarios and hard facts in
attempt to improve company’s response. Every area of security defines how the
target will respond or how it is accessed. It follows the concept of defence in
depth; therefore, the target must be tested on each layer. The goal of Red Team
is to not find as many vulnerabilities as possible but to test the detection
and response capabilities of an infrastructure along with their security
environment.
Difference b/w
Read Team and Vulnerability Assessment : Vulnerability assessment is the process of
analysing of a system that focuses on finding vulnerability and prioritizing
them by risk. Validation or exploitation of a vulnerability is not performed
during while vulnerability assessment. When compared to Red Team engagement
vulnerability assessment doesn't take priority. A Red Team may not use any
vulnerabilities. They may generate an operational impact that any insider can
perform to test the response of an insider attack. Red Teams rarely if ever run
common vulnerability assessment tools as they are loud and generate more
traffic than a typical Red Team engagement is willing to accept.
Difference b/w Red
Team and Blue Team : Red
Teams are the attackers whereas Blue Teams are the defenders. Red Team members
are adept at all forms of digital attack, as well as social engineering and
other methods to find ways to break into the systems of a company - but they are
bound by employment agreements or legal contracts to not disclose what they
find to anyone but the company that is being tested. While Team almost always
works as employees of the company that is undergoing the testing, and are
usually members of the IT Security or Data Security divisions of the company's
IT group. Blue Teams have two major areas of operations. Their only focus is to
find vulnerability and patch them as it seems fit. They can also keep providing
security during the Red Team engagement.
Red Team operator
traits
An effective Red Team
is comprised of a Team of individuals who can contribute the overall success.
Diversity is crucial, but the Team as a whole must be comprised of the core
operator traits. A Team can be even more successful when multiple Team members
contribute in multiple areas.
Core Operator Traits :
Red Teams are given
opportunities to touch and manipulate target networks in ways typically only
done by real threats. Full-scale Red Team operations can allow Red Team
operators to really put on their bad guy hats, an engagement can be very
intellectually stimulating and enjoyable for an operator, but operators must
respect target organizations. A great deal of trust is placed on an operator.
It is common for a Red Team to position themselves to do serious damage or
embarrassment to an organization. And with all this, each Red Team operator
should comply the following:
·
Executes
engagement requirements as directed
·
Complies
with all laws, regulations, policies, programs, and Rules of Engagement
·
Implements
the Team’s operational methodology and TTPs
·
Identifies
and has input to target environment deficiencies
·
Researches
and develops new exploit tools and tests tools for functionality
·
Performs
Open Source Intelligence as required for the engagement
·
Identifies
and assesses actions that reveal system vulnerabilities and capabilities
·
Assists
the Red Team Lead in development of the final engagement report
·
Performs
Physical Assessment support under direction of Red Team Lead
Why do we need Red Team?
To challenge the
extend of an organisation's defences so that when and if a real attack happens
then they stay protected or come up with a counter measure. For example, a
group of hackers has a goal of stealing critical data from a target. A targeted
phishing attack tests the end user’s awareness of the attack. The payload of
the attack tests the network and host defences against delivery of malware and
ultimately code execution, If the attack does trigger a defence, the response
tests the defender’s actions in identifying, responding or stopping the attack.
In any case, the entire scope of security defence is analysed. A highly skilled
Red Teamer can tune their attacks to identify where the failure points are by
turning up or down that ‘volume’ of an attack.
Red Teams are able to
execute custom threat as part of their engagement. It can test a subset of
security of new threat type or validate the effectiveness of security controls
against a new or specific threat types. Threat emulation scenarios are a valuable
distinguisher of Red Teaming from other types of security assessments and can
be used to understand how an organization stands up to new zero-day attack.
Working of Red Team?
Red Team tactics
contains a full scope, multi layered diverse attacks to simulate real world
attacks to measure the security alignments that are applied. Assessments of Red
Team starts with reconnaissance to collect as much information as possible
about the target in order to determine the way best way possible to exploit it.
This collecting of information also helps to build attacking environment and
selection of tools. Most of the working of Red Team is on offensive side rather
than defensive. Once the remote access to exploited system is managed and
stabilised, the actual attacking takes action.
What is the
specialization of Red Teamer?
Red Teamers must
understand and be an expert in a diverse set of technologies such as :
·
Different
operating systems and software packages
·
Diverse
networking protocols
·
Custom
applications and protocols
·
Physical
security defences
·
Social
interaction
·
Custom
or specialized technologies
·
System
Engineering
·
Networking
·
Software
Development
·
Physical
Attacks
What comes under Red Team Operation?
Methodology of Red Team
What are Pre-Engagement
Data Requirements?
The
pre-engagement data requirements are :
·
Target
POC list
·
Notification
Requirements
·
Threat
level
·
ROE
·
OSINT
·
Analysis
of Potential Attack Vectors and Tools
What is a Red Team
Standard Attack Platform?
A standard attack
platform is the common set of tools and hardware used by a Red Team to perform
an engagement. The term standard is critical. Using a standard platform allows
for:
·
Better
Logging : A common platform shares the same base build, directory structure,
and built-in data capture capability.
·
Easier
Deconfliction : A common set of tools and payloads, along with standard
logging, can help an organization quickly work through the deconfliction
process.
·
Common
Baseline A common base provides a stable, functional environment for a Red Team
to operate.
·
Access
to Better Toolset : A shared platform is built from the knowledge of many
people. The best tools, references, and guidelines can be contributed from
multiple senior Red Team members to include their expertise in the toolbox.
·
Custom
Tools Work Across Attack Platforms : Red Teams often build tools. If these
tools are built to work on a standard attack platform, they will work for all Red
Team operators.
·
Tool
Vetting : In some cases, a Blue Team or customer requires tools to be vetted as
threat faithful. When using a standard attack platform, a tool vetting process
is often required before including a tool. This way, all tools are managed and
validated before use. Tool validation is often due to a fear the Red Team tools
may cause damage to a system.
·
Consistent
Processes : Using a common baseline help enable a common set of processes. A
common set of processes can allow the skills and knowledge of senior operators
to be used by junior operators. This can greatly enhance an engagement’s
success and better use limited resources.
What are Red Team
engagement roles and responsibility?
White Cell : A white cell basically enforces
the rules of the engagement to ensure neither Red Team nor defender activities
cause unexpected alerts or problems on the target environment. It helps to co-ordinate
activities to ensure engagement goals.
Engagement Control
Group : It
represents the management of target environment as well as provides required
information that is necessary for constructing valid scenarios. Also, it helps
to establish blacklist if its needed.
Physical Access Team :
The sole purpose of Physical Access Team in Red Team is to enter gates,
buildings, offices, server rooms, etc. along with demonstrate physical access
to systems and network in order to gain access to devices or anything
desirable.
General Guidelines
for Red Teaming :
·
All
Red Team members are responsible for safeguarding all customers data. This said
data includes Personally Identifiable information (PII), Industry BBP.
·
Red
Teamers should work under Privacy Act Information.
·
They
should avoid data mining of files containing privacy act, medical, justice,
worship or religious pursuit or any other protected or privilege information.
·
Red
Team is normally authorised to exploit files, e-mail and/or message traffic stored
on the network or communications transiting the network including everything
else. However, each Red Team member should ensure that all the information
exploited is necessary and within the scope of engagement.
·
Red
Team should not be modifying the data found or conduct DDOS unless it's
specifically requested. As it is required of the Red Team to not otherwise
intentionally degrade or disrupt normal operations of targeted system being
exploited.
How to handle client
data?
Client data should be
handled with extreme care. The information collected during an engagement can
be misused if fallen in wrong hands.
Permission :
The ROE should
identify permissions for Authorization :
·
Actions
·
Data
Collection
·
Data
Leverage
·
Target
Space
·
User
Groups
Policy Controls :
It is implemented by
the Red Team and it includes :
·
A
Red Team non-disclosure agreement
·
Data
training which means identifying and avoiding PII, PA data, etc.
·
Ethics
training
·
Individual
Background Checks
Physical Controls
:
There should be
multi-layer of physical controls applied to protect the engagement tools and
operating system from any kind of loss. Therefore, Red Teamers should be
accustomed with physical controls that are in place. Such security mechanisms
include :
·
Tools,
computing systems and costumer data be stored inside isolated room secured with
cipher lock and controlled only by Red Team.
·
Minimize
contact between the Team and external entities.
·
When
not in use, all data and equipment should be removed and placed into lockable
cases, safes or storage cabinets.
·
During
travel, laptops, and hard drives are secured at all times.
·
All
visitors to Res Team space should be escorted and signed in and out.
·
Customer
data should only be handled by Red Team personnel with need to know.
·
During
off-site engagement, data should be encrypted for transmission.
Software Controls
:
The following
software controls are designed to ensure the confidentiality, anonymity and
safety of information should always be employed in whatever context :
·
Each
host and guest operating system should be encrypted and protected with a strong
password.
·
Each
host and guest operating system should be employed with a host-based firewall
specific to the engagement.
·
Data
and tools utilized during an engagement should be stored in an encrypted
container and moved to the working directory only when needed.
·
All
Red Team tools and software should be removed from the target environment at
the end of the engagement.
·
All
access, movement and use of data and tools should be added to the OPLOG
(Operations Logs).
·
If
a tool is not needed then it should be removed from the environment.
Common repository
:
·
A
common repository should be made available to all the Red Teamers assigned to
engagement.
·
It
should be stored within an encrypted volume
·
It
should always be encrypted volume lives on centralised server/NAS/file share
·
It
should be mountable or accessible only after authentication
·
Repository
layout should be in Hierarchy.
Data Collection
Data collection is
the core of every engagement. Data collection is directly proportionate to the
success of engagement. in other words, the collection of data drives the value
of the engagement. Data collection should be complete with the enabling of
replication of activities and results. It should also help you to identify the
items of significant interest to the operators. Final Data sets should include
:
·
Pre-event
data
·
Execution
data
·
Operator
logs
·
Automated
data collection and logs
·
Screenshots
·
Post
event data (data archive, closeout brief, final report)
Execution data
requirements
Under this, the Team
has to make sure that all data that is being handled is safely logged. All
activities related to Red Team operations should be logged as the engagement
begins and only terminates after all the activity related to the engagement is
completed. The events that should be logged are :
·
Scanning
activities
·
Exploiting
events
·
Stimulation
efforts
·
Deconfliction
discovered
·
Target
information discovered
·
Target
acquired and lost
·
System
events
·
Login
attempts
·
Credentials
captured
·
Credentials
used
·
File
system notifications
·
Modification
or disabling of security controls
·
Modifications
or suppression of security alerts or logs
·
Methods
of persistence employed
·
Methods
access
·
Methods
of access
·
Methods
of persistence employed
·
Command
and control channels established
·
Request
to increase, decrease, pause activity
·
ROE
conflicts, request and modifications
Operator Logs
As stated earlier,
all the activity should be logged accurately and concisely. at the very least,
the following information must be collected and logged for each action
performed :
·
Start
Timestamp (UTC Recommended)
·
End
Timestamp (UTC Recommended)
·
Source
IP (Attack/Test System IP address)
·
Destination
IP (Target IP Address)
·
Destination
Port (Target Port)
·
Destination
System Name
·
Pivot
IP (if applicable, list IP of any system used as a pivot, port forwarder, etc.)
·
Pivot
Port (if applicable, list send and receive ports leveraged in pivot system)
·
URL
(Note, it is important to capture the FULL URL of the Target instance)
·
Tool/Application
·
Command
(Full command)
·
Description
(why or for what purpose was the action was performed)
·
Output
·
Result
·
System
Modification (Modified file, dropped binary location, enabled functions, etc.)
·
Comments
·
Screenshot
·
Operator
Name
Also, when creating
log entries, documenting actions, uploading/downloading files, dropping
binaries, etc. It is recommended to document this in the
YYYYMMDDHHMM_IPDescription format.
Automated Data
Collection
Where ever the
chance, the Team should use tools and scripts available to capture and
consolidate engagement data. Data collected by automated tools will never be
enough for Red Team. However, if employed properly, complements the Red Team
workflow and enables the operator to continue operations with the manual
capture of data pertinent to the activity performed.
Terminal logs
All Red Teams
engagement systems should have automated collection of raw terminal data. Each
command should be prefixed with operator's IP and UTC timestamp. It is more
important that data is accurately captured rather than being captured in a
novel way.
Commercial tools
Most tools used for Red
Team have some level of logging the activities, but the location of logs that
will be maintained is different depending on the tool and many of them requires
for the operator to trigger log generation. In any case it is quite handy to
use commercial tools.
Consolidation
Daily transfer of
these logs to the engagement repository is recommended. Preference should be to
create a backup script that copies each set of logs to the repository when
executed at the end of the day.
Screenshots
Details concerning Red
Team actions are often met with disbelief. Even when the Team has undeniable
evidence of access to a highly restrictive network or physical area, target
personnel sometimes have issues conceding access was obtained. And so, provide
the proof whenever required.
What is Red Team
Engagement flow?
The Red Team
engagement flow is a dynamic process but can be managed through distinct steps.
the flow of Red Team includes :
Engagement
Planning
Engagement planning
starts when first contacted by the customer and realistically doesn't end until
the day of execution. Engagement determines the objectives of the working of
the Team. Engagement planning includes :
·
Rules
of engagement
·
Management
risk
·
Threat
Planning
·
Deconfliction
Process
·
Costs
and Funding
Rules of
Engagement : The
rule of Engagement establishes the responsibility, relationship and guidelines
between the Red Team, the customer and the system owner. This Rules of
Engagement drives the whole process of execution. Rules of Engagement includes
:
·
Authorised
Actions
·
Explicitly
Restricted Actions
·
Authorised
Targets and Target Space
·
Restricted
Items
·
Engagement
Objectives
The Rule of
Engagement document consist of Red Team methodology with detailed description
of activities and execution process along specification of the hardware and
software to be employed. It also includes deconfliction process with the
mention of threats available and their comparison. It also must include
identification and references to appropriate legal requirements along with the
legal responsibility disclaimer. Task of each Red Teamer must also be
documented along with the whole information of the target. This information of
the target has organization name, address, specific groups or divisions,
organizational identifiers, senior management contact info.
Pre-coordination is
the base of successful engagement. To construct an effective plan, the Red Team
must understand the target environment, all stakeholders, and any addition
legal and contractual requirements of the target environment.
Management Risk : It is a process of identifying,
accessing and controlling that risk that comes from the engagement factors. The
main aim of managing risk to remove unnecessary risks instead of eliminating
all of them, along with implementing efforts that are outlined in ROE without
causing any irreversible damage to target environment. It is the responsibility
of Red Team to implement risk management and accepting all the risks at an
initial stage. Risk Management is important to Red Team engagement as it helps
to conserve resources, avoid unwarranted risk, making alternative decision when
required and taking effective control measures. The Risk management process
includes :
·
Identify
potential issues
·
Assess
each risk to determine the direct impact to the target environment
·
Develop
controls designed to mitigate risks
·
Make
a risk decision
·
Identify
Residual risk
·
Continually
assess
Risk Evaluation
under Management Risk
Evaluation is often
visualized by constructing a Risk Assessment Matrix. This matrix is commonly
used to estimate the degree of severity and probability for each potential
vulnerability.
Standard 3x3
Vulnerability Risk Matrix Example:
Probability: The
likeliness that an event will occur
·
Low
— Unlikely
·
Medium
— May result in
·
High
- Likely
Impact: is the
expected result of an event (degree of injury, property damage or other mission
impairing factors) measure as:
·
Low
— Restricted Impact on Operations
·
Medium
— Measurable impact on Operations
·
High
— Important Impact on Operations
Standard 5x4
Vulnerability Risk Matrix Example:
Probability: The possibility
of occurrence of an event
·
Frequent
- Occurs often
·
Likely
- Occurs several times in x period
·
Occasional
- Occurs sporadically
·
Seldom
- Unlikely, but could occur
·
Unlikely
- Probably will not occur
Severity: is the
expected result of an event (degree of injury, property damage or other mission
impairing factors) measure as:
·
Catastrophic
Direct impact, Rustically long duration if not permanent
·
Critical
—Significant Impact, Stops or Halts operation
·
Moderate
— Noticeable loss, Reduces/Slows Operation/Production
·
Marginal
— Limited loss, noticed but does not halt operation
·
Negligible
— Some loss, Unnoticed if not monitored closely
The key in the above
matrix construct is vulnerability; however, Red Teaming is not vulnerability
focused. Given that thought process, the Red Team’s alternative risk matrix
should be constructed to determine the risk of potential threat actions.
Threat Planning
It is a major factor
in Red Teaming engagement. In this stage following information is obtained from
the customer and OSINT:
·
Threat
Information (Landscape TTPs)
·
Threat
to the Target Environment (OSINT)
·
Threat
to the Target Environment (Customer Issues, Previous Grievances)
·
Real
world example of threat
·
Threat
in Engagement condition
·
Level
of Threat
·
Target
Data
The realism of threat
must be taken under consideration by the Red Team. It is the job of Red Team to
select attack types and strategies to simulate realistic threats even if the
organization decide not to unleash the full capabilities of the threat. Defining
threat-based attacks will provide a viable mechanism for training the target
audience and strengthening the target environment. In order to outline the
initial list of attacks the Red Team to carefully weigh the different options
in regard to the engagement.
The end goal of
threat planning is to portray the threat as real as possible in order to
protect the organization from the real attack.
De-confliction
process
De-confliction allows
Red Team to clearly identify which activity is to be and not be generated by
them. The said activity includes both network and physical activities. In this
stage of engagement is to be able to distinguish between Red Team activity and
real-world attack as quickly and as correctly as possible. deconfliction
process includes :
·
Ensuring
trusted agents understand the actions and impacts of activities as they occur.
·
All
OPLOGS are accurately and thoroughly completed.
·
Providing
OPLOGS and activity list to the ECG as requested
·
Exchanging
periodic situation reports with the white cell.
When the
De-confliction is requested it is the duty of the Red Team lead to assess the
information and isolate the information from Red Team activity. This includes:
·
Halting
all activities in the area of the incident
·
Reviewing
the ROE for limitations, objectives and dc-confliction instructions
·
Reviewing
OPLOGS to determine activities the Team was conducting at the time indicated
·
Confirming
or Denying Red Team activities for each deconfliction incident
·
Confirm
findings with the ECG, White Cell, and TA.
·
Ensure
findings are relayed by e-mail as well as by telephone
·
Maintaining
records of de-confliction information, actions, assessment and findings
·
If
assessment indicates the Red Team is the originator:
·
Determine
and isolate the specific activities and scripts employed
·
Determine
and isolate the specific logs supporting the timeframe of the incident
·
Notify
the Engagement Control Group
The engagement
planning process should include the estimate amount of time required to
properly execute the De confliction process and when to use it.
Free play is an
excellent concept to greatly enhance the results of A Red Team engagement. This
concept allows the time to deviate from plan in order to explore for
interesting operations. A Red Team lead can always provide guidance to freely
explore as time allows them to.
Engagement
Execution
Halting an engagement
simply means pausing current actions for a certain span of time. It is
important to decide and plan the conditions where a pause is required. In following
conditions, a HALT is required:
·
Deconfliction
request are received
·
Real-world
issues impact the target environment
·
Key
personnel suddenly become unavailable
A SITREP (Situation
Report) is generally performed by Red Team lead. It is to be maintained at all
times. And it should contain the following information:
·
Current
location of operation (systems/networks for network Teams or buildings/offices
for physical Teams)
·
Information
pertinent to the objectives of the Team
·
Information
key to the success of engagement impacts
·
Updates
or modifications to the ROE
·
Recent
actions of each Team member
·
Current
action of each Team member
·
Intended
future actions of each Team member
Detailed methodology of
Red Team
·
Reconnaissance
·
Perform
Open Source intelligence (OSINT) against the target
·
Search
using open unauthenticated sources
·
Target
websites
·
Social
Media
·
Search
engines
·
Public
Code repositories
·
Alternate
target sites
·
8
External Enumeration
·
Identify
external assets
·
Perform
reverse DNS scan to identify registered hosts
·
Identify
URLs and other external touch points from scan and OSINT
·
Web
presence evaluation
·
Browse
as a normal user through a web proxy to capture intelligence and understanding
·
8
Identify known vulnerabilities and vulnerable conditions
·
Do
not send attack code at this time
·
Execution
and Exploitation
·
Attempt
to exploit targets based on current knowledge
·
Perform
situational awareness on target
·
Attempt
Local Privilege Elevation
·
Attempt
Domain or other system level Privilege Elevation
·
Post-Exploitation
·
Continue
internal and Domain enumeration
·
Identify
domain user/groups/memberships
·
Identify
IP space
·
Identify
file shares
·
Establish
persistence
·
Use
persistence plan to place agents on target systems
·
Move
Laterally
·
Operational
Impact
·
Perform
realistic stimulation against target systems
·
Does
not need to be highly complex
·
Does
not need to leverage known or traditional vulnerabilities
·
Does
not always require administrative (local/domain) privileges
·
Does
require actual impact to the target environment
·
Does
require input from the ECG and TA (during planning)
·
Do
notify the ECG and TA when the operational impact is executed to avoid unwanted
(possibly
·
catastrophic)
defensive actions
·
Does
need to exercise the target’s detection, incident response, continuity, and
recovery plans and procedures at a minimum.
How to End the Red Team
Engagement?
After the execution
of engagement is done, it is very important to systematically end the Red Team
Engagement. Some of the important things to remember when ending the Red Team
engagement are reverting modifications, executive out brief and tech on tech
sessions.
Once the execution of
Red Team is done with, all the tools, artefacts, exploits and persistence
mechanisms should be auto destroyed by a self-destruct code written as both
time-based and target-based; for it to be able to prevent execution outside the
engagement window or to prevent exploitation outside the target environment.
And for all the things that could be self-destroyed, it is the responsibility
of Red Team to essentially remove it from the environment.
In the event that
target system security controls were disabled:
·
Restore
the controls as soon as possible
·
Test
the control to ensure restoration
·
Notify
the TA of any security control that does not effectively restore
In the event that
target system modifications were made:
·
Revert
file system modifications
·
Remove
access mechanisms and/or backdoors
·
Remove
C2 and persistence mechanisms
·
Terminate
C2 Channels
For all restoration
actions:
·
Ensure
file artefacts generated by the mechanism are removed
·
Examine
entire system to confirm the mechanism was not inadvertently copied or moved
·
Remove
or restore registry keys if used
·
Restore
modified files
·
Remove
or replace launch files with original
·
Examine
start-up scripts if used.
·
Remove
execution mechanisms
·
Remove
installation mechanism
·
Copy
log files generated by the mechanism to the Red Team repository and remove them
from target system
·
Continue
connection monitoring for stray or missed mechanisms
·
Repeat
process for strays
·
Provide
a list of all artefacts, names, hashes, locations, and clean-up status to TA
Executive out brief
is a meeting dedicated towards impact of Red Team engagement on the
organization and how to protect it. In this meeting, Red Team lead has to
highlight critical observations made during the engagement along with
additional information security or technical staff. Legal staff and critical
system information’s can also be included with the observation of 'where the
organization is vulnerable'.
A tech on tech
briefing can be extremely valuable to the organization as it provides
bi-directional exchange of information between Red Team and blue Team. During
this exchange, both the Red and defensive elements provide a highly detailed
step-by-step technical review of the actions and results (including all
associated detail) of the engagement.
The role of Red Team
during tech-on-tech:
·
Explains
Red TTPs and intended lOCs
·
Their
initial thought process for meeting engagement objectives
·
Steps
through Red actions and associated activity/commands (This occurs
simultaneously to defender walk through)
·
Describes
why those actions were executed (What lead the RT to that specific action)
·
Provides
the results of each action and how that action enabled the next
·
Provides
recommendations or techniques that would limit each threat action
The role of Defensive
Team tech-on-tech:
·
Has
the opportunity to ask the how and why
·
Explain
the process for securing and defending their environment
·
Identify
any alerts, triggers, or anomalies within the environment during engagement
·
Step
through blue actions in response to Red Team activity (this occurs
simultaneously to Red Team walk through)
·
Identifies
how Red Team activity could have been detected, prevented or leveraged
·
Provides
feedback to Red Team actions and recommendations
·
Uses
tech-on-tech information to perform post engagement analysis prior to receipt
of official report
Report Writing
Reporting is a
critical aspect of Red Team Engagement. Reports are major form of evidence that
can be analysed and used to provide a base for improving security. Reports are
important as they confirm the existence of engagement. Reports not only
document the activity that occurred during a specific engagement, but provide
an excellent reference that can be used to plan and design other engagements.
Many engagements can share similar approaches and goals. Reports can provide a
roadmap to design and plan future engagements. Reporting a Red Team engagement
can be quite different than reports generated in penetration tests or
vulnerability assessments. Red Team engagements are highly scenario focused.
This leads to a report that is story driven. Penetration testing or
vulnerability assessment reports focus on findings. security tests. Rather than
discover that an out-of-date patch can cause successful exploitation of a
workstation, a Red Team may use the exploit to deploy a command and control
agent. This agent can be used to explore an organization and ultimately steal
proprietary organizational data. The Red Team is driven by goals intended to stimulate
or measure not only technical flaws but security operations as a whole. This
includes people, processes, and technology. A Red Team report will use a
story-based format where observations instead of findings are listed.
Report includes
various perspectives such as attack narrative. The Attack Narrative section of
the report contains the observations made during a Red Team engagement. These are
typically written in a chronological format. Key observations that a Red Team
uses to achieve goals must be documented. This includes any step Red Team takes
to achieve a goal. Threat profiles or other lOCs that Blue can use during post
analysis should be included. The end of a Red Team engagement is can be the
beginning of post forensic analysis. Blue Teams who take advantage Red Team
lOCs by performing post analysis can use this information to find blind spots
or tune security tools to better protect against threats.
Report Outline
Types of
observation that should be documented:
Key actions that led
from initial access to the final goal
·
Initial
access
·
Lateral
movement
·
Privilege
escalation
·
Command
and Control (C2) description
·
Include
network information (IP addresses, Domain name, Ports, Protocols, etc.)
·
Include
agent information (Binaries, Scripts, Locations, Registry Changes)
·
Include
persistence methods
·
Reconnaissance
actions and results
·
Other
interesting observations that assisted the Red Team during the Engagement
·
Other
interesting observations that may be of concern but not directly related to the
engagement
An observation should
include the following elements
·
Narrative
description
·
Technical
details
·
Source/Destination
I P addresses
·
Tools
or techniques
·
Results
·
Screenshots